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ABSTRACT
The paper analyses the position of the British institutions, of the embassy in Peking and of the con-
sulate general in Kashgar, before the attempt of the Afghan ruler Amānallāh to establish diplomatic 
relations with the Chinese Republic in 1920. Amānallāh, who ascended the throne of the emirate in 
1919, rejected the British protectorate over Afghanistan and his victory in the Third Anglo-Afghan 
War certified the country’s full independence. The provisional nature of the 1919 Treaty of Rawal-
pindi, followed by the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, left many doubts still open about the interna-
tional status of Afghanistan. Moreover, the proximity between Afghanistan and the Russian Bolshe-
viks introduced a further ideological element of difficulty in the geopolitical picture of Central Asia 
after the First World War. Central to the diplomatic dialectic was also the status of Afghan subjects 
in China, particularly in Hsin-chiang, and to whom their possible consular protection should be en-
trusted. The last part of the paper is dedicated precisely to the analysis of a specific case, the arrest 
of a man considered an Afghan by the Chinese, but subject of the princely state of Chitral according 
to the British. The case helped to better define the boundaries of the matter. The paper is essentially 
based on British archival sources.
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INTRODUCTION
With the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, Afghanistan regained its full independ-
ence also in foreign affairs, freeing itself from British suzeraineté. One of the first ac-
1 This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17F17306. Between 1 Novem­
ber 2017 and 31 October 2019, the author was a JSPS International Research Fellow at the 
Kokoro Research Center, Kyoto University.
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tions of the young monarch Amānallāh3 (regnabat 1919–1929) was precisely aimed at 
establishing diplomatic relations with other countries through a series of missions 
and international agreements. This paper will focus on the analysis of the British po-
sition with regard to the Afghan attempt to establish, inter alia, diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of China.
The status of Afghanistan still had to be definitively clarified by the 1921 treaty, 
while the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi did not give full clarity on the situation in the 
country. Finally, a concrete case will be briefly analysed, namely the arrest and depor-
tation of a subject of the princely state of Chitral, considered by Hsin-chiang author-
ities to be an Afghan subject. Despite the divergence between the British and Chinese 
on the real nationality of the man, the case served to clear up the diplomatic issue.
THE TREATY OF RAWALPINDI
The political history of relations between Afghanistan and Britain between the first 
half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century is marked 
by three wars and a series of agreements that cross, determine and surpass the tem-
poral space of the Great Game. The First Anglo-Afghan War was fought between 1839 
and 1842, parallel to the First Opium War with the Ch’ing Empire which led to the 
Treaty of Nanking, with the British conquest of Hong Kong and the opening of five 
Chinese ports to British trade without the need for intermediaries. On the Central 
Asian front, however, the defeat of Her Majesty’s troops was heavy.4 A new conflict 
with Kabul was fought between 1878 and 1880.5 With the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 
the British managed to establish their own protectorate over the country,6 moving 
3 In this paper the Wade­Giles phonetic transcription system was adopted for the Chinese 
language in order to ensure consistency with the names transcribed in the documents. For 
the Afghan names, I have followed the transliteration scheme of the Encyclopædia Iranica. 
The names of the cities of Kashgar (Uyghur Latin Yëziqi: Qeshqer) and Yarkand (Uyghur 
Latin Yëziqi: Yeken, also known in Chinese as Sha­ch’e 莎車) follow the common forms in 
English and in the documents of the time. For the toponyms of British India, the English 
form of the time was adopted. As for the names of persons, for whom it was not possible 
to trace the original form in the Arabic­Persian alphabet, it was preferred to leave them 
according to the phonetic transcriptions present in the archival documents. The name of 
the Tibetan capital Lha­sa follows the Wylie system of transliteration.
4 On the First Anglo­Afghan War, see: A. FORBES, The Afghan Wars: 1839–42 and 1878–80, 
London 1892, pp. 1–157.
5 The Second Afghan War, 1878–1880: Abridged Official Account, produced in the Intelligence 
Branch Army Head­Quarters, India, London, 1908.
6 Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari and the Emir of Afghanistan, Moḥammad Yaʿqūb, signed 
the Treaty of Gandamak (Gandomak) on 26 May 1879. The text reads: “III. His Highness the 
Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in ac-
cordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will en-
ter into no engagements with foreign States, and will not take up arms against any foreign State, 
except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Govern-
ment will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be em-
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further north the first line of defence of the British Raj border from a possible Rus-
sian invasion. The Great Game ended in 1907 with the Anglo-Russian Convention.7 
The two European powers delimited their spheres of influence in Persia and recog-
nized the Chinese suzeraineté over Tibet, pledging to respect the territorial integrity 
and not to interfere in the internal administration of the Land of Snows, not to send 
representatives to Lha-sa and not to request any concession. As for Afghanistan — 
whose status as British protectorate had been reaffirmed by another agreement with 
the Emir in 19058 — the 1907 entente reiterated the British influence, which, however, 
could not be used against the Russians. The latter accepted the role of the British as 
intermediaries (with the exception of direct relations between the border authori-
ties for local matters), obtaining, however, the same commercial privileges granted 
by Kabul to the British and the Indians.
The Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 sanctioned the full independence of Afghan-
istan also in the field of international relations: the conflict began a few months af-
ter the end of the First World War, in May 1919, with the ascension to the throne 
of Amānallāh (regnabat 1919–1929), which formally proclaimed the independence of 
ployed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should Brit-
ish troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will 
return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been 
accomplished. IV. With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now estab-
lished between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and for the bet-
ter protection of the frontiers of His Highness’ dominion, it is agreed that a British Representative 
shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and 
dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents 
with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the 
British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external 
fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court 
of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British 
India as may be similarly agreed upon”. The full text (English version) of the treaty is in Brit-
ish and Foreign State Papers, 1878–1879, Vol. LXX, compiled by the Librarian and Keeper of 
the Papers, Foreign Office, London, 1886, pp. 49–52. Cavagnari was the first British Rep­
resentative in Kabul, but was killed a few weeks after taking up his post during an attack 
against the British legation. The attack reopened the hostilities that continued until 1880 
with the exile of Moḥammad Yaʿqūb and the ascent to the throne of ʿ Abd­al­Raḥmān (reg-
nabat 1880–1901). On the Second Anglo­Afghan War, see also: H. HENSMAN, The Afghan 
War of 1879–80, London 1881; FORBES, pp. 159–327. On Cavagnari, see: K. P. DEY, The Life 
and Career of Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, C.S.I., British Envoy at Cabul, Together with a Brief 
Outline of the Second Afghan War, Calcutta 1881. For a political history of Afghanistan in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, see: M. H. KAKAR, A Political and Diplomatic Histo-
ry of Afghanistan, 1863–1901, Leiden 2006.
7 The National Archives, London­Kew (further only TNA), Foreign Office (further only FO) 
535/10, Enclosure 1 in No. 49, Convention, 18 (31) August 1907, pp. 31–35.
8 British Library, London (further only BL), Mss Eur F131/5, Treaty between the British Gov-
ernment and the Amir of Afghanistan, Dated 21 March 1905, with papers relating thereto, Lon­
don, 1905, Parliamentary Paper Cd 2534, No. 8, Translation of Treaty signed at Kabul on 
the 21st March, 1905, p. 9.
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Kabul not only in internal administration, but also in foreign policy.9 The conflict 
ended after a few weeks with a peace treaty signed in Rawalpindi on 8 August 1919.10 
The English delegation was led by Sir Hamilton Grant.11 The Treaty of Rawalpindi did 
not formulate a permanent decision on the question of the Afghan sovereignty in 
foreign policy, but merely stated in Article 4 that “the British Government is desirous of 
the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so long existed between Afghanistan and 
Great Britain provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are on their part 
sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Govern-
ment are prepared therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and 
conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after 6 months for the discussion and amicable 
settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment 
of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis.” With Article 5, “[t]he Afghan Government 
accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early 
demarcation by a British commission of the undemarcated portion of the line to the west 
of the Khyber where the recent Afghan aggression took place and to accept such boundary 
as the British commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their 
present positions until such demarcation has been effected.” A letter written by Grant was 
however given to the Afghan delegate to assure him of the newfound full autonomy: 
“By the said Treaty and this letter, therefore, Afghanistan is left officially free and independ-
ent in its affairs, both internal and external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been 
cancelled by this war.”12
9 BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/14/61, East India (Afghanistan). Papers regarding hostilities with Af­
ghanistan 1919. Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1919, XXXVIII, Cd 324, Proclamation by Amir 
Amanulla Khan (undated), No. 2, Translation, pp. 4–5. On the third Anglo­Afghan War: 
BL, IOR/R/12/LIB/106, The Third Afghan War 1919. Official account: Compiled in the Gener-
al Staff Branch, Army Headquarters India, Calcutta: Government of India, 1926; P. SYKES, 
A History of Afghanistan, Vol. II, London 1940, pp. 270–282; G. N. MOLESWORTH, Afghan-
istan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War, Bombay 1962. On Afghanistan 
during Amānallāh see L. POULLADA, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King 
Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society, Ithaca 1973.
10 BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/14/61, East India (Afghanistan). Papers regarding hostilities with Af­
ghanistan 1919. Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1919, XXXVIII, Cd 324, From the Viceroy to 
the Secretary of State for India, 9 August 1919, No. 66, pp. 35–36. 
11 BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/14/61, East India (Afghanistan). Papers regarding hostilities with Af­
ghanistan 1919. Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1919, XXXVIII, Cd 324, From the Viceroy to 
the Secretary of State for India, 22 June 1919, No. 56, p. 31.
12 “You asked me for some further assurance that the Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Gov-
ernment contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan in external or 
internal matters. My friend, if you will read the Treaty of Peace with care you will see that there is 
in it no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have informed me that the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan is unwilling to renew the arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla 
Khan, agreed to follow the advice of the Government of Great Britain in matters affecting the ex-
ternal relations of Afghanistan, without reserve. I have therefore refrained from pressing this mat-
ter of which the Treaty of Peace contains no mention. By the said Treaty and this letter, therefore, 
Afghanistan is left officially free and independent in its affairs, both internal and external. Fur-
thermore, all previous treaties have been cancelled by this war.” BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/14/61, East 
India (Afghanistan). Papers regarding hostilities with Afghanistan 1919. Parliamentary Pa­
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The difficulty over the position to assume for British diplomacy in China — and 
that will be analysed in the next pages — laid in fact in the ambiguity of the situation 
of Afghanistan between 1919 and 1921. The deliberate ambiguity and temporariness of 
the 1919 treaty left the British hoping for a rapid return as protagonists on the scene 
of Afghan foreign policy. In the words of Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, in the 
aftermath of the Treaty of Rawalpindi: “We regard result of peace negotiations as highly 
satisfactory. With a few modifications, none of which is essential, Afghan delegates have 
accepted our draft Treaty in full. […] While we realise that we have embarked on the nature 
of an experiment, we ourselves believe that in the end it may well prove more satisfactory 
and successful than the old arrangement. Much will depend on the way Afghan Government 
is handled. They are very sensitive of the outward shadows of their liberties, but we feel con-
fident that, if due allowance is made for this, there is every chance that they will eventually 
seek our advice of their own accord in essential matters.”13
THE 1920 AFGHAN MISSION  
AND THE AFGHAN SUBJECTS IN CHINA
In March 1920, Miles Lampson — at the time British chargé d’affaires in Peking14 — 
asked for information from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs about the news of 
an Afghan delegate sent “to Peking to negotiate on the subject of commercial relations”.15 
The Chinese minister denied the news of a mission to the capital, but specified that 
“an Afghan King’s letter addressed to President had been handed to Governor of Hsinchiang 
and should reach Peking in about a month from now”.16 In this regard, the diplomat asked 
pers (HoC) 1919, XXXVIII, Cd 324, From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 9 
August 1919, No. 67, p. 36. 
13 BL, IOR/L/PS/10/819, File 1953/1919, Part I, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9 Au­
gust 1919, no. 852, f. 173, p. 59. The Treaty of Rawalpindi, however, was followed by the An­
glo­Afghan Treaty of 1921. This document formally reaffirmed in Article 1 the control of 
Kabul of its foreign policy, but at the same time the Afghans recognized the border with 
the Raj along the Durand Line, that had been defined in 1893 by another agreement signed 
by Emir ʿAbd­al­Raḥmān and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. English text of the 1921 Trea­
ty: Treaty between British and Afghan Governments. Signed at Kabul, November 22, 1921, Cmd. 
1786, London 1922.
14 TNA, FO 371/5323, Foreign Office to India Office, 3 April 1920, f. 175.
15 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Lampson to Foreign Office, 10 March 1920, f. 160. Actually, as ear­
ly as 1919, the Afghans had already tried to open their own consulate in Kashgar. Four Af­
ghans, including the interpreter of the mission in Taškent, Abdul Ghani, — who had also 
worked with the illustrious Swedish explorer Sven Hedin — had gone to Irkeštam, on the 
Russian­Chinese border, to negotiate the issue, but they had been rejected by the Tao­yin 
of Kashgar. According to Percy T. Etherton, British Consul­General in Kashgar, an Afghan 
diplomatic representation in Hsin­chiang “would simply resolve itself into a Bolshevik cen-
tre and a dangerous intrigue against us”. TNA, FO 371/3698, Major P. T. Etherton to Foreign 
Secretary, 1 October 1919 (British Consulate­General, Kashgar Diary for September 1919), 
f. 356, p. 3.
16 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Lampson to Foreign Office, 10 March 1920, f. 160.
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“any special instructions” to the Foreign Office.17 The Afghan mission was led by Ma-
hendra Pratap.18
A problem that could involve the British diplomatic authorities was the position to 
be taken in case of request for protection by Afghan subjects. According to the India 
Office, “His Majesty’s Government have foregone right to control Afghan foreign relations 
and therefore logically His Majesty’s Representatives abroad are no longer obliged to assist 
Afghan subjects.”19 As said, the provisional nature of the Treaty of Rawalpindi, how-
ever, did not definitively clarify the issue, but for the India Office “Afghan attempts to 
obtain direct representation abroad should be in no way encouraged”.20 
The contradiction of the Chinese position, however, was highlighted in the refusal 
of the Chinese authorities “to admit Afghan Consul, Kashgar, and at same time refuse 
to recognise any longer our right to protect Afghan subjects”.21 This position had already 
been explicitly defined by the President of the Chinese Republic at the end of April 
1919.22 Percy T. Etherton, British Consul-General in the Chinese Turkestan, was in-
stead in favour of continuing the consular protection of the Afghan subjects.23 Even 
the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, recognized the need for British extension of 
protection not only because of the Chinese refusal, but also “in face of evidence of desire 
of Afghan Government that their subjects should no longer be dependent on our Consular 
protection”.24 The idea of Viceroy was therefore a “withdrawal of our Consular aid and 
protection from Afghans in Chinese Turkestan”.25 Furthermore, if the Afghan govern-
ment had failed to open its consulate in Kashgar “it would be powerful lever in our hands 
if Afghan Government were forced to apply to us for aid”.26
From the Chinese point of view, in fact, the issue concerned the lack of clarity 
on the new international status of Afghanistan.27 The letter that Amānallāh had sent 
first to the Governor of Hsin-chiang and then to Peking explained to the Chinese the 
newfound autonomy in foreign policy, inviting them to send a representative to the 
country.28 In this regard, the Chinese minister asked Lampson for clarifications, but 
17 Ibidem.
18 M. PRATAP (Raja), My Life Story Of Fiftyfive Years (December 1886 to December 1941), Delhi 
1941, pp. 61–65.
19 TNA, FO 371/5323, India Office to Viceroy, 8 March 1920, f. 163.
20 Ibidem.
21 TNA, FO 371/5323, From Viceroy to India Office, 9 March 1920, f. 171.
22 TNA, FO 371/5318, Major P. T. Etherton to Foreign Secretary, 1 December 1919 (British Con­
sulate­General, Kashgar, Diary for November 1919), f. 72, p. 1.
23 “Consul-General, Kashgar, wishes Chinese Government to be pressed to recognise this right”, TNA, 
FO 371/5323, From Viceroy to India Office, 9 March 1920, f. 171.
24 Ibidem.
25 Ibidem.
26 Ibidem.
27 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Lampson to Foreign Office, 30 March 1920, f. 173. 
28 Ibidem. As reported by the British Consul­General in Kashgar, there was also an explicit 
“request to Chinese not to allow British any jurisdiction, in the case of Afghan subject”. TNA, FO 
371/5323, Mr. Lampson to Foreign Office, 22 March 1920, f. 168. Furthermore, according 
to Etherton “Chinese reply will probably be non-committal; they are undoubtedly apprehensive 
of Afghan and Bolshevik aggression”. Ibidem.
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the latter avoided a definite answer, with the excuse of not having a copy of the treaty 
and to wait in any case for the prospected changes to the document.29
Even according to Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu, as well as for the 
Viceroy of India, the British Consul-General in Kashgar was not supposed to con-
tinue to formally protect the Afghan subjects.30 For Montagu, however, Etherton did 
not have to formally renounce to the “right to protect Afghans”, but he had to play his 
role on the basis of the positions of the Chinese authorities of Hsin-chiang.31 The 
same position was also shared by George Curzon,32 at the time Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. 
On 10 April 1920, a few days after the matters dealt with up to now, Lampson sent 
a (“very urgent”) telegram to the Foreign Office: “I have received very mutilated tele-
gram from His Majesty’s Consul General at Kashgar to the effect that question is arising in 
acute form and that Chinese local authorities challenge our right now to protect Afghan(? 
and) have in one case arrested and imprisoned an Afghan holding British registration cer-
tificate.”33 The British Consul-General in Kashgar “enquires whether he is authorized 
to demand surrender of imprisoned man and to continue protection generally”.34 Lamp-
son realized that it would be quite embarrassing for British diplomacy not to take 
a clear position on that occasion with regard to the issue of protection of Afghan 
subjects.35
On the one hand there was the position of the Afghan government, opposed to 
leaving the protection of their subjects in the hands of Britain.36 It was indeed vital, 
for the nascent Afghan diplomacy, to define its own role without constraints. Having 
to negotiate a new treaty with the British shortly, the position of Kabul has to be seen 
as an attempt to anticipate its terms in the international relations space, in order to 
fix, on a political ground, what was formally guaranteed by the Grant’s letter to the 
Afghan delegate in Rawalpindi. Indeed, if the Afghans had kept relying on British 
diplomacy, this could have undermined the recent external autonomy of the Central 
Asian emirate. At the same time, if the British had continued to represent Afghan 
interests abroad, this situation would have reported back to the period before the ac-
cession to the throne of Amānallāh and the Third Anglo-Afghan War and conditioned 
the new negotiations. A first response to Lampson came from the Viceroy of India, 
reaffirming the position that the Consul-General in Kashgar had to follow: “He should 
 
29 “He asked whether it was the fact that Afghanistan was now in a position to openly direct diplo-
matic relations with foreign countries? I replied that not being in possession of text of Treaty I was 
afraid that it was useless to discuss its provisions of which I had not accurate knowledge: but I un-
derstood that it was subject to revision in 6 months from its entry into force. This fact appeared 
to make a marked impression upon him.” TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Lampson to Foreign Office, 
30 March 1920, f. 173. 
30 TNA, FO 371/5323, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 5 April 1920, f. 183.
31 Ibidem.
32 TNA, FO 371/5323, India Office to Foreign Office, 3 April 1920, f. 180A.
33 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Lampson to Foreign Office, 10 April 1920, f. 185.
34 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem.
36 Ibidem.
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now definitely be instructed not to press Chinese authorities to recognise his right to afford 
Consular protection to Afghan subjects in Chinese Turkestan.”37
British diplomacy had to move cautiously. As understood by Lord Chelmsford, 
a direct British intervention aimed at preventing the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Kabul and other countries could have resulted in a stronger Af-
ghan aversion towards their old protectors: “All Amir’s actions since signing of peace 
treaty point to increasing desire of Afghanistan to pose as fully independent and civilised 
nation, and we see no probability of her consenting, in course of any negotiations which 
can at present be anticipated, to restore our control of her foreign relations in any shape. 
Only prospect of ultimate reversion to former status seems to lie in her being given all the 
rope she wants. If she then finds herself hopelessly embarrassed she may turn again to us 
for advice. If on the other hand we now seek by subterranean means to prevent other Powers 
from entering into direct relations with her she will certainly attribute their refusal to us 
and only become more suspicious and hostile”.38 Moreover, the Viceroy fully realized the 
impossibility to intervene anyway on “unfriendly Powers such as Germany” to prevent 
a formal relationship with the Afghan government, while a similar action on “friendly 
Powers” would have done nothing but leave a free hand to the others.39 The hope was 
that the overabundance of foreign delegations in Kabul would not allow the emer-
gence of a new hegemonic power over the emirate capable of undermining the role 
that geography (“from our geographical position”) had assigned, however, to the Raj and 
then to Great Britain.40 Lord Chelmsford also hoped that such a presence of foreign 
representatives would contribute to the opening of Afghanistan.41 It was therefore 
possible to inform Peking about the new status of Afghanistan and perhaps also to 
communicate to the Chinese authorities “that the only foreign representative at present 
in Kabul is that of Bolsheviks”.42
On 24 April, the British ambassador to Peking, Beilby Alston, therefore asked the 
Foreign Office for authorization “to instruct all Consuls to abandon tacit claim to protect 
Afghan subjects in China”.43
While recognizing “the force of the arguments” explained by Lord Chelmsford, the 
Secretary for India, Montagu, was less inclined to a clear British position with other 
countries on Afghan autonomy: “He [Montagu] feels doubtful whether, at the present 
time — when a renewal of hostilities is possible and the relations between Great Britain and 
37 TNA, FO 371/5323, Viceroy of India to Mr. Lampson, 13 April 1920, f. 191.
38 TNA, FO 371/5323, Viceroy of India to India Office, 17 April 1920, f. 200.
39 Ibidem.
40 “There would be of course be great possibility of embarrassment in presence at Kabul of representa-
tives of other Powers such as Turkey, Russia, Persia, China, Japan, Germany and France, but their 
intrigues would probably neutralise one another and perplex the Afghans, while we should always 
exercise predominant influence from our geographical position in the same way as Czarist Russia 
did at Teheran.” Ibidem.
41 “Moreover, presence of numerous foreign representatives at Kabul which Amir seems to desire can 
hardly fail in the long run to act as solvent to harsh and fanatical spirit of Afghans to break down 
their isolation and make them much less unpleasant and dangerous neighbours than they have 
hitherto been.” Ibidem.
42 Ibidem.
43 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Alston to Foreign Office, 24 April 1920, f. 202.
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Afghanistan may again be profoundly altered:– His Majesty’s Government would be well-ad-
vised to commit themselves to a definite pronouncement as to the international status of Af-
ghanistan vis-a-vis other Powers.”44 Montagu therefore preferred to leave the issue still 
in the political and institutional limbo that the Treaty of Rawalpindi had outlined, if not 
directly with Afghanistan, at least with the other states and instead of a clear indica-
tion to the consuls by Alston, “His Majesty’s Minister at Peking should content himself with 
informing them of the terms of the Treaty of August 1919 and of Sir Hamilton Grant’s letter to 
the Afghan delegate and leave them to draw their own conclusion”.45 However, Montagu was 
not opposed to informing the other consuls about the position to be taken vis-à-vis the 
Afghan subjects, i.e. continuing to formally maintain the possibility of providing con-
sular protection, but avoiding acting in concrete cases in the face of a Chinese denial.46 
Furthermore, a similar issue was also involving the Kingdom of Siam, another country 
where Afghans were trying to establish their own diplomatic representation, although 
the country was evidently outside Kabul’s network of direct interests.47
THE ARREST OF MAHOMET SAID
Among the cases that ended up on the Etherton’s desk in Kashgar in 1920, one was 
that of a certain Mahomet Said, “a British subject from Chitral […], an escaped crimi-
nal”.48 Chitral was one of the small princely states of British India, on the border with 
Afghanistan.49 According to the British Embassy in Peking, Mahomet Said had been 
arrested along with others, “a mixed party of Afghans and others, probably opium smug-
glers, who had entered Chinese territory by an unfrequented route”.50 After the arrest, Ma-
44 TNA, FO 371/5323, India Office to Foreign Office, 6 May 1920 (No. P3383; Registry number 
F761/111/10), f. 206.
45 Ibidem.
46 “[…] while not explicitly abandoning in principle the right to protect Afghan subjects, they should 
in practice refrain from any attempt to exercise the right in opposition to the wishes of the local Chi-
nese authorities.” TNA, FO 371/5323, India Office to Foreign Office, 6 May 1920 (No. P2895; 
Registry number F762/111/10), f. 212.
47 TNA, FO 371/5323, India Office to Foreign Office, 6 May 1920 (No. P2895; Registry num­
ber F762/111/10), f. 212; TNA, FO 371/5323, Earl Curzon to Mr. Seymour (Bangkok), 13 May 
1920, No. 1, f. 215; TNA, FO 371/5324, Mr. Seymour to Earl Curzon, 18 October 1920, No. 1, 
f. 17; TNA, FO 371/5324, Government of India to Mr. Seymour, 10 August 1920, Enclosure 
1 in No. 1, f. 17; TNA, FO 371/5324, Mr. Seymour to Government of India, 18 October 1920, 
Enclosure 2 in No. 1, f. 17.
48 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Clive (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Foreign Office), 1 July 1920, f. 217.
49 The territory of the ancient state and of the homonymous city is today in Pakistan. The 
State of Chitral had accepted the suzeraineté of Kashmir in 1878 and then, in 1885, it was 
visited by the Lokhart Mission (I. D. SCOTT, Notes on Chitral, Simla 1937, pp. 3–4). For 
the report of the Mission: BL, IOR/L/PS/20/B57, The Gilgit Mission, 1885–86. By Colonel Sir 
W. S. A. Lockhart and Colonel R. G. Woodthorpe, London 1889). In 1891, the King of Chitral 
obtained from the British an annual payment of 12,000 Rs., accepting the English guide 
for international relations and for the defence of the border (SCOTT, p. 4).
50 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Clive (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Foreign Office), 1 July 1920, f. 217.
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homet Said had been (probably) deported from the Chinese territory “as an Afghan”, 
but the authorities had denied a Sino-British “joint enquiry in regard to his national-
ity”, notwithstanding the requests by Etherton.51 The matter had come up to Peking, 
to the British Embassy and therefore to the Wai-chiao Pu, the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of the Republic of China.52 In the letter that the Wai-chiao Pu had sent to Beilby 
Alston, the Chinese assured him that Mahomet Said was of Afghan nationality and 
consequently “he should be dealt with as a non-treaty national and the Taoyin’s action was 
perfectly justified”.53 In any case, Alston himself was not particularly interested in the 
question of defining the nationality of Mahomet Said, as for the fact that, as seen, the 
Chinese treated Afghans at this point “as ‘non treatyʼ nationals”.54 Indeed, the case of 
Mahomet Said had posed the issue openly.
Even for the India Office, while advising to protest with the Chinese government 
for not conducting an investigation together with the Kashgar consul, “no notice 
should be taken at present at any rate of Chinese definition of Afgans as non-Treaty individ-
uals. This in fact appears to be correct definition in present circumstances”.55 According to 
Montagu “it would be well to avoid raising the point in any way at the present time”.56 The 
same position was also shared by Lord Chelmsford.57
CONCLUSION
A new attempt, more fruitful than the one described in this article, to establish a Si-
no-Afghan relationship was again carried on by the Afghan Emir always with his en-
voy, Mahendra Pratap.58 At the beginning of 1922 a Chinese mission went to Kabul and 
an Afghan consul arrived in Yarkand in October 1922.59 According to Etherton, “[t]he 
appointment of this official and the consequent creation of an Afghan Consulate at Yarkand 
assists the Bolshevik scheme to establish a base for propaganda and intrigue in Turkistan, 
whence they can plot against India in more favourable circumstances than from their orig-
inal base at Tashkent”.60
The inquiry of the failed Afghan attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China — analysed in the perspective of the English diplomacy and insti-
tutions — helps to clarify the ambiguity of the position of the Empire with respect 
51 Ibidem.
52 TNA, FO 371/5323, ff. 217–218.
53 TNA, FO 371/5323, Wai Chiao Pu to His Majesty’s Minister, Peking, 23 June 1920, f. 221.
54 TNA, FO 371/5323, Mr. Clive (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Foreign Office), 1 July 1920, f. 218.
55 TNA, FO 371/5324, India Office to Viceroy, 21 September 1920, f. 3.
56 TNA, FO 371/5324, India Office to Foreign Office 12 October 1920, f. 5.
57 TNA, FO 371/5324, From Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department to India Office, 4 Oc­
tober 1920, f. 6.
58 P. T. ETHERTON, In the Heart of Asia, London, 1925, pp. 217–218.
59 Ibidem, pp. 219–220. According to Etherton: “The appointment of this official and the conse-
quent creation of an Afghan Consulate at Yarkand assists the Bolshevik scheme to establish a base 
for propaganda and intrigue in Turkistan, whence they can plot against India in more favourable 
circumstances than from their original base at Tashkent.” Ibidem, p. 220.
60 Ibidem.
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to the autonomy of Afghanistan in foreign policy following the Third Anglo-Afghan 
War. What has been presented in this paper also clarifies the objective difficulty for 
the British in having to manage a situation that would be clarified only in November 
1921, with the signing of a new treaty between London and Kabul with a solemn and 
clear recognition of full Afghan independence. However, the prospect of the nego-
tiations of the new treaty further influenced the position of the British diplomats 
and authorities, in as tight a position as they were among the different political and 
geopolitical purposes, i.e. the arduous balance that had to stem from earning the trust 
of the Afghans, the need to maintain, moreover, a more than privileged relationship 
with the Central Asian country and, finally, the attempt to limit and shape also the 
role of the other powers in their relations with the emirate.
